Prising apart the Merrill writedown
The headline is Merrill Posts Record Loss on $16.7 Billion Writedown. Let's take the Merrill earnings release and pull it apart a bit. Specifically, consider the CDO positions.
A first glance, the position seems fairly benign.
But now consider the footnotes:
Now, amortisation reduces exposure. But the high grade number is up. So the increase must be due to ineffective hedges. This emphasises that these are net numbers.
Ah. Those would be the monolines that are doing so well at the moment. I don't want to rain on Merrill's parade, but if I were an investor, I might want to know a bit more about those hedge counterparties other than their ratings. The weighted average spread they trade at in the CDS market perhaps. That would give some idea of where between a net $4.8B and a gross $30.4B the exposure really lies.
A first glance, the position seems fairly benign.
But now consider the footnotes:
(2) Primarily consists of principal amortization for U.S. super senior ABS CDO net exposures, as well as changes in hedges and increases due to ineffective hedges.
Now, amortisation reduces exposure. But the high grade number is up. So the increase must be due to ineffective hedges. This emphasises that these are net numbers.
(3) For total U.S. super senior ABS CDOs, long exposures (including associated gains and losses reported in income and other net changes in net exposures) were $46.1 billion and $30.4 billion at September 28, 2007 and December 28, 2007, respectively. Short exposures (including associated gains and losses reported in income and other net changes in net exposures) were $31.3 billion and $23.6 billion at September 28, 2007 and December 28, 2007. Short exposures primarily consist of purchases of credit default swap protection from various third parties, including monoline financial guarantors, insurers and other market participants.
Ah. Those would be the monolines that are doing so well at the moment. I don't want to rain on Merrill's parade, but if I were an investor, I might want to know a bit more about those hedge counterparties other than their ratings. The weighted average spread they trade at in the CDS market perhaps. That would give some idea of where between a net $4.8B and a gross $30.4B the exposure really lies.
Labels: ABS, Broker/dealers, Credit, Monoline, Writedown
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